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Little is known about the cognition of deception (Gombos, 2006). We propose a cognitive
account of serious lying (i.e., deception involving high stakes) in response to a solicitation of
a truth: Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT). Built on the Activation-
Decision-Construction Model of answering questions deceptively (Walczyk, Roper,
Seeman, & Humphrey, 2003), the theory elaborates on the roles of executive processes,
theory of mind, emotions, motivation, speciﬁes cognitive processing thoroughly, and
considers the rehearsal of lies. ADCAT’s four processing components are (a) activation of
the truth, the (b) decision whether and how to alter deceptively the information shared, (c)
construction of a deception, and (d) action [acting sincere while delivering a lie]. Core
constructs are “theory of mind” and “cognitive resources”. Speciﬁcally, throughout serious
deception, individuals are inferring the current or potential mental states of targets and
taking steps to minimize the allocation of cognitive resources during delivery to appear
honest and lie well.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. The need for a cognitive theory of serious deception
Deception is intentionally leading another to believe
something that the sender believes is untrue. It comes in
many forms, including falsiﬁcation (lies), equivocation
(evasion, ambiguity), omission (withholding important
information), exaggeration, and understatement (Masip,
Garrido, & Herrero, 2004). The cognition of deception is
poorly understood (DePaulo et al., 2003). We present a
cognitive theoretical framework for understanding serious
deceptions, including those that
are fundamentally perceived as threats, transgressions
and betrayals that result speciﬁcally in relationship; fax: þ1 (318) 257
czyk), LauraBeliech@
.K. Duck), dsm037@
1
ier Ltd. This is an open accproblems; that endanger people’s reputations and that
are forbidden by organized religion and indictable by
law (DePaulo, Ansﬁeld, Kirkendol, & Boden, 2004,
p. 148).
We deﬁne serious deception, a term hereafter used
interchangeably with high-stakes deception, as an instance
of deceit embedded in a social context inwhich sharing the
truth might prove very costly to individuals in not meeting
their goals. For less serious deception, the potential cost of
truth telling is small. A much more precise deﬁnition is
offered later in Section 3.4.1 of this article.
Beyond explaining an interesting aspect of social life, a
cognitive account can advance lie detection. Scientists
studying lying have often postulated that it is more
cognitively demanding than truth telling (e.g., Sporer &
Schwandt, 2006; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008;
Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981), an intuitively
appealing notion that is not always so (DePaulo et al.,
2003). A theory can illuminate when lying draws more oness article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
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2010). In particular, Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, and Tcholakian
(2013) noted that one of the major criticisms of the Con-
trol Question Technique (CQT) of the polygraph as a lie
detector is its lack of a valid theoretical foundation. A well-
speciﬁed cognitive theory of deception can advance
cognitive-based lie detection efforts that overcome this
limitation. A glossary of important terms used hereafter
appears in Table 1. A boldfaced, lowercase letter (e.g., {a})
following each in text shows its table entry.
2. Perspectives with relevant insights on the
cognition of deception
Six perspectives offer important insights on the cogni-
tion of deception. For instance, Zuckerman et al. (1981)
proposed the impactful Four-Factor Theory of deception.
Deception involves (a) generalized arousal, (b) guilt and
other emotions, (c) cognitive aspects, and (d) liars’ attempts
to control verbal and non-verbal cues to appear honest.
Although these authors speculate that lying imposes
greater “cognitive load” {i} than truth telling, which can
result in longer response times and in other signs of load,
the theory does not elaborate on the cognition of lying. It
highlights the complex, multifaceted nature of deceit, a
notion embraced by the theory we propose.
The cognitive load of lies of omission is central to Lane
and Wegner’s (1995) Preoccupation Model of Secrecy. It
postulates that when individuals keep secrets, for example,
withholding from a romantic partner the truth of having
served time in prison, (a) the strategy most often used is
thought suppression. (“I will stop thinking about myTable 1
Glossary of important constructs of ADCAT.
{a} Central executive: the “supervisor” of working memory (i.e., executive fun
strategies and sets goals, contends with novelty and complexity, anticipates
strategies, and inhibits responses inconsistent with goals. It is also responsi
metacognitive processing of self-monitoring, self-control, and explicitly ﬁnd
capacities are needed in deceptive responding (Debey et al., 2012; Gombos
in truth telling.
{b} Visuo-spatial sketchpad: a temporary store where visual/spatial images a
{c} Phonological loop: a buffer for auditory/verbal information, for instance,
about seven chunks, which quickly decay without rehearsal.
{d} Episodic buffer: a limited capacity, temporary store for integrating memo
modalities, such as retrieved autobiographical memories (Baddeley, 2000).
{e} Respondent: one who faces a truth solicitation, i.e., a social context calling
{f} A lie: a verbal communication in response to a solicitation of a truth made
of the intent (Ekman, 1996).
{g} Target’s View: Any incomplete, false, or otherwise inaccurate representati
Views can vary in complexity from a correct understanding less an importa
false alibi of the perpetrator’s whereabouts during the crime). Analogous to
the Target’s View in the respondent’s mind can consist of propositions, ima
may manifest in a variety of ways (e.g., narrative, a denial, non-verbally).
{h} Cognitive resources: the limited pools of attention and working memory
{i} Cognitive load: the demand on “cognitive resources” (see {h} above) made
{j} Intrinsic cognitive load: adapted from Cognitive Load Theory (Merrienboe
inherent to deceive well, which depends on the complexity of the social co
perpetrator of a crime is preparing for a police interrogation when he will c
interrogators know and are likely to ask him and his partners in crime.
{k} Extraneous cognitive load: adapted from Cognitive Load Theory (Merrien
to the act of deception that reduces respondents’ cognitive resources while
liars, Vrij et al. (2008) suggested that respondents answer questions while o
might interfere more with lying than truth telling.criminal past to avoid accidentally blurting it.”) (b) Over
time, this ongoing suppression can cause the secret to
intrude in the thoughts of the individual. (“I can’t stop
thinking about what I did.”) (c) Intrusive thoughts renew
attempts at thought suppression. (“I will try harder to block
these memories.”) (d) This cycle can advance such that the
individual obsesses over the memories even long after a
secret has been shared. This model acknowledges the dif-
ﬁculty often involved in hiding guilty knowledge and un-
derscores memory processes in deception, as does our
theory of high-stakes deception.
Vrij, Granhag et al. (2010) identiﬁed six ways in which
the cognitive load of dishonesty can exceed that of honesty.
(a) Formulating a “lie” {f}may be cognitively demanding by
requiring a novel response. Not taking their credibility for
granted, liars (b) tend to monitor and control their
demeanor to appear honest, and (c) monitor targets’ re-
actions to seewhether their deceit is believed. (d) Liars may
need to remind themselves to role-play and (e) suppress
the truth as they fabricate. (f) While activation of the truth
often happens automatically, activation of the lie can be
more deliberate. These are useful hypotheses we accept of
when lying may impose more cognitive load but do not
specify underlying mechanisms. Thus, they do not
comprise a theory.
A fourth perspective is Information Manipulation The-
ory 2 (IMT2; McCornack, 1992; McCornack, Morrison, Paik,
Wisner, & Zhu, in press), which explicates how the infor-
mation of a communication can be altered deceptively. At
its foundation is Grice’s (1989) Cooperative Principle of the
implicit expectations between two parties conversing.
IMT2 characterizes deception as a covert violation of one orction) that coordinates the slave systems (b–d below), it selects
outcomes, allocates and shifts attention between tasks and
ble for awareness of others’ states of mind (ToM) and the
ing information in memory (Baddeley, 1996). All of these
, 2006; Visu-Petra et al., 2014; Visu-Petra et al., 2012) more than
re manipulated.
the words of a question recently asked. Its capacity is small,
ries from diverse sources across space, time, and sensory
on him or her to share accurate information.
with the intention of deceiving the target, who is unaware
on of reality a respondent intends to induce in a target.
nt detail (lie of omission) to an elaborate fabrication (e.g.,
the propositional base of the Manstein model (Herrmann, 1983),
ges, and other cognitive representations that, when delivered,
available to “respondents” (see {e} above).
by tasks, environments, or other conditions facing respondents.
r & Sweller, 2005), this is the demand on cognitive resources
ntext (DePaulo et al., 2004). For instance, suppose that a
onvey the false alibi. To avoid inconsistencies, he must infer what
boer & Sweller, 2005), this is any situational factor external
lying/truth telling. For example, to maximize cognitive load on
perating a driving simulator so that the concurrent load induced
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fers to the expectation that the information conveyed is
accurate. Falsiﬁcations are lies wherein incorrect informa-
tion is knowingly communicated. (b) Quantity is the
expectation that sufﬁcient information is shared and
important information is not withheld. Lies of omission
violate this maxim. (c) Relevance (or Relation) pertains to
the expectation that the information transmitted is perti-
nent to the discussion. Attempts to sidetrack targets from
the information they seek are deceptive. (d) Finally,Manner
is the expectation that information will be conveyed in an
ordered, clear, and succinct way. Deceivers may intention-
ally be ambiguous or obscure to divert targets’ attention
away from particular information. IMT2 details when and
why information sharing can be deceptive and explains the
spontaneous lying of normal conversation but is less
applicable to high-stakes lies (S. McCornack, personal
communication, January 7, 2013). IMT2’s focus on infor-
mation manipulation is central to the present theory.
Aﬁfthperspective is Sporer andSchwandt’s (2006, 2007)
Working Memory Model of deception. By it, lying requires
more cognitive effort than truth telling due to its greater
demands on “cognitive resources” {h}. Truth telling entails
retrieving or reconstructing a memory. When lying, de-
ceivers must invent new stories or modify those available
from past experiences or scripts. Narratives must be plau-
sible and not contradict themselves or what targets know.
Liarsmust alsomonitor listeners for signs of suspiciousness.
When there are no relevant past experiences or scripts in
long-term memory (LTM), the working memories (WM) of
liars will be heavily laden, reducing capacity for speech
production. This model offers important insights we adopt
on the sources of information that liars use to construct false
narratives but does not detail cognitive processing.
The sixth perspective is the Activation-Decision-
Construction Model (ADCM) of Walczyk et al. (2003,
2005), Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Grifﬁth-Ross
(2009), which analyzes the act of answering questions
deceptively into three components. First, a question heard
or read activates the truth from LTM, usually automatically.
Second, basedon the truth and social context, adecision to lie
may be made, typically to advance liars’ goals. Responding
honestly will then be actively inhibited, especially for well
practiced truths that can interfere with lying the most.
Third, a context-appropriate lie is constructed that must be
coherent and plausible. In reviewing cognitive models of
deception,Gombos (2006) found theADCMtobepromising,
delving more deeply than others into the cognitive pro-
cesses of deceit but criticized it as under-speciﬁed on the
roles of executive, emotional, motivational, and social fac-
tors. It is the basis of the theory that follows, also incorpo-
rating insights from the other ﬁve perspectives.
3. Activation-decision-construction-action theory
(ADCAT)
ADCAT is a cognitive theory of deception involving high-
stakes (i.e., serious) situations as “respondents” {e} react to
solicitations of truths, such as a guilty suspect interrogated by
police, a unqualiﬁed job candidate interviewed for a coveted
position, or anunfaithful spouse confrontedby hiswife. Suchdeception usually entails planning and rehearsal (Colwell,
Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007; Ekman,
1992; Hines et al., 2010; Strömwall & Willén, 2011). The
theory is much better speciﬁed than the ADCM regarding
cognitive, emotional, motivational, and social processes.
ADCAT assumes that deception and truth telling do neither
differ in basic underlying cognitive processes, nor do they
utilize brain areas different from other cognitive processes
(Mohamed et al., 2006). Memory processes are fundamental
to both, as are decision making and problem solving
(Gombos, 2006). Regarding the latter, lying is a means-ends
problem solving strategy for closing the gap between the
current state and respondents’ goals (McCornack et al., in
press). ADCAT is built from established constructs of cogni-
tive science, such as “working memory”, “theory of mind”,
and the “central executive” {a}. Finally, ADCAT is a cognitive
theory of deception, emphasizing the manipulation of in-
formation over the impression management aspect (i.e., the
monitoring of and control over non-verbal behavior; see
Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Doering, 2010).
3.1. Roles of motivation and emotion
Liars’ motivation to succeed moderates cues to decep-
tion. For instance, highly motivated liars tend to exhibit the
most non-verbal cues in their attempts to control expres-
sive behaviors (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; Ekman & Frank,
1993; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006; 2007). ADCAT interprets
level of motivation as the total cognitive resources re-
spondents are willing to assign to lie well. The higher the
motivation the greater and more sustained the allocation
can be, a view of motivation that has been validated in skill
acquisition (Kanfer & Ackerman, 1989).
Emotions have several key roles. First, they provide
strong motivators for deception (Ekman, 1992). Second,
high anxiety and other extreme emotional states can
impose “extraneous cognitive load” {k} on respondents
(Beilock & Carr, 2005; Eysenck, 1992), reducing resources
for lying. Third and foremost, emotions or memories of the
emotions elicited by the truth, the social context, or by the
anticipated reactions of targets to the truth, to potential
deceptions, or their detection impact the decision to
deceive, deception construction, and delivery.
3.2. The components of ADCAT, core constructs, and central
principle
Four components are hypothesized for most instances of
serious deception, usually in the order described, not always
occurring closely in time. The Activation Component con-
cerns any aspect of the social environment that causes re-
spondents to understand that a truth (accurate information
sought by targets) is solicited and then retrieve or encode it
to WM if possible. The Decision Component involves the
social context persuading respondents to deceive in a
particular way or reminding them of a decision made pre-
viously, which sets the level of motivation for dishonesty.
The Construction Component is the manipulation of infor-
mation (see McCornack, 1992) to falsify, equivocate, omit,
exaggerate, or understate or the recall of a prepared
deception then adjusted for the social context. Lastly, the
Fig. 1. The ﬂow of information and processing among the four components.
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delivering lies to targets. Fig. 1 shows the typical processing
ﬂow for serious lies. Milestones are marked jointly in the
text and ﬁgure with the letters [A] through [L]. Although
components are presented sequentially as distinct process-
ing steps for illustration, they often execute automatically,
unconsciously, seamlessly, and in parallel. Moreover, they
draw on modules of the mind providing output to WM
whose processing occurs beneath conscious awareness
(Baars & Franklin, 2003, 2007; McCornack et al., in press).
A core construct permeating ADCAT is theory of mind
(ToM), which supports social-cognitive functioning
(Apperly, Samson, & Humphreys, 2009). It is “the ability to
infer others’ mental states, thoughts, and feelings”
(Kobayakawa, Tsuruya, & Kawamura, 2012, p. 341) and
reason about their beliefs, desires, intentions, and knowl-
edge (Astington & Baird, 2005). This capacity is needed to
create false impressions in targets (DePaulo, 1992; Peskin,
1992; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007; Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) and plays other
central roles in lying, such as when respondents guess the
likely impact on targets of sharing the truth or assess
whether potential lies are plausible (Gombos, 2006).
Research shows that the central executive supports ToMinferences, which can be abstract and indirect (Gombos,
2006). A ﬁrst-order inference is ascribing a mental state
to another (e.g., “This cop thinks that I am the burglar.”). A
second-order inference ascribes a mental state to one
concerning the mental state of another (e.g., “The cop also
believes Johnny was duped by me into being an accom-
plice.”, Apperly et al., 2009; Talwar et al., 2007), and so
forth. First-, second-, and third-order inferences can occur
in high-stakes deception and burden working memory
(Apperly, Back, Sampson, & France, 2008). The central ex-
ecutive also helps overcome interference of the truth when
inducing false beliefs in others (Apperly et al., 2009) by
temporarily repressing the truth (Apperly et al., 2008).
Another core construct is cognitive resource. Related to it
is the Central Principle: Because cognitive resources are
limited and respondents generally seek to appear sincere,
ﬂuent, and relaxed during delivery (Ekman, 2001), they will
take steps to minimize “intrinsic cognitive load” {j} during the
Action Component and minimize extraneous load throughout.
3.3. Activation component
[A] Many signals within a social context can tell re-
spondents that an important truth is solicited by targets.
Table 2
Common motives of serious deception.
Motive Description
1. Instrumental: This lie obtains rewards, power,
social position, or other advantages, sometimes
by exploiting others. (Delight at a sense of
control, excitement at prospect of reward;
greed; Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984;
DePaulo et al., 2004; Lindskold & Walters, 1983;
O’Hair & Cody, 1994; Turner, Edgely, &
Olmstead, 1975)a
2. Avoid punishment: A lie prevents punishment or
blame for liars for wrongdoing. (Desire for a
sense of relief, lower anxiety; DePaulo et al.,
2004; Ekman, 1989)
3. Protect self: This lie protects liars, often
psychologically, by avoiding confrontation or
embarrassment. (Insecurity, fear of
embarrassment, reduce anxiety; DePaulo et al.,
2004; Seiter, Bruschke, & Bai, 2002; Turner,
Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975)
4. Identity-relevant, self-presentation, face-saving:
These lies create false impressions about liars’
identities or identity-relevant experiences.
(Desire for respect, sense of pride, reduce
insecurity; Camden et al., 1984; DePaulo et al.,
2004; McCornack, 1997; O’Hair & Cody, 1994)
5. Protect/help others: An altruistic lie is told to
protect targets or others. (Compassion,
empathy, nurturance; O’Hair & Cody, 1994;
DePaulo et al., 2004; Metts, 1989; Seiter et al.,
2002)
6. Entitlement: Liars feel justiﬁed in hiding a truth
they feel is unfairly disapproved of or prohibited
by targets. (Sense of resentment or indignation;
DePaulo et al., 2004)
7. Hurt others: A lie is shared in reprisal to hurt the
target. (Anger, vengeance; DePaulo et al., 2004;
O’Hair & Cody, 1994)
8. Affect Interpersonal Relationships/Afﬁliation: A lie
is told to increase, decrease, maintain, or
terminate interaction with another or control
the intimacy. (anger, out of insecurity; Camden
et al., 1984; Lippard, 1988; Turner et al., 1975)
a Likely emotions impelling lies.
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approaching the driver side window of the car of an
intoxicated driver who was pulled over after leaving a bar.
An explicit signal can be a question asked in a serious tone
during a job interview. For both, a related truth will enter
WM if accessible (Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010), often
based on respondents’ ToM inferences of the information
targets are seeking and possibly why it is sought. In the ﬁrst
case, the driver infers that it concerns howmuch she drank.
The ADCM assumed that truths are retrieved from LTM or
constructed from memories (Walczyk et al., 2003). Some-
times, however, they are constructed impromptu based on
information encoded directly from the social context, such
as after the police ofﬁcer asks the driver “Do you knowwhy
youwere pulled over?” The solicitation may require that an
episodic memory corresponding to the truth be retrieved
from LTM (Ekman, 2001). If a question is asked, as each
word is encoded into the “phonological loop” {c} of WM,
word meanings are activated from semantic memory along
with related episodic memories (Baddeley, 1992; Kintsch,
1998).
If applicable and accessible, the episodic memory of the
truth is transferred from LTM to the “episodic buffer” {d} of
WM, [B] often receiving the highest cumulative activation
(Baddeley, 2000; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). Although
transfer is typically automatic (Duran et al., 2010; Johnson,
Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2004; Walczyk et al., 2003), when
episodic or semantic truths are accessed infrequently or not
recently, cognitive resources may be required to search
memory explicitly for them, which involves the central
executive (Conway, 2002; Glenberg, Schroeder, &
Robertson, 1998; Menson, Boyett-Anderson, Schatzberg, &
Reiss, 2002). One caveat, “truths” may be unavailable or
inaccurate unbeknownst to respondents due to memory
distortions, especially with long intervals between encod-
ing and retrieval (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Loftus, 2007).
Essential to deception is respondents’ intent to deceive, not
the accuracy of what they believe is true (Ekman, 1996).
Respondents for whom lying is not contemplated, for
instance, because of their honest personalities (Hood,1982)
or who have nothing to hide (e.g., an innocent suspect),
who need share only simple facts [C] (e.g., ﬁrst name) can
do so easily. [L] If these respondents must assemble truths,
they will go to the Construction Component [D].
3.3.1. Summary of core constructs
Respondents will often use their ToM to infer the truths
sought by targets and why. Truth retrieval generally occurs
automatically in both lying and truth telling, except when a
truth is remote or unavailable in memory. If a truth need
not be newly constructed, for infrequently accessed truths,
explicit memory searching can impose a high intrinsic
cognitive load on respondents, especially truth tellers (Vrij,
Granhag et al., 2010).
3.4. Decision component
This component, the most important of ADCAT, con-
cerns that which convinces respondents to manipulate
deceptively the information shared in high-stakes truth
solicitations. Typical motives appear in Table 2, a non-exhaustive list. Emotions commonly propelling such lies
are also noted. Serious lies usually entail respondents
highlymotivated to achieve important goals (DePaulo et al.,
2004; Porter & ten Brinke, 2010), such as getting away with
a crime (motive 2-Table 2), obtaining a coveted job (motive
1), or staying married (motive 8).
3.4.1. Rational and quasi-rational decision making
Decision making is inﬂuenced by emotional reactions to
choice options and can occur largely unconsciously (Baars &
Franklin, 2003, 2007). The brain’s orbitofrontal cortex sup-
ports forming expectations and evaluating the affective
value of possible reinforcers, which allows respondents to
compare likely outcomes of choices (Bechara, Damasio, &
Damasio, 2003; Damasio, 1994). Truth solicitations can
present respondents with a decision: should the informa-
tion sought by targets be fully and accurately shared or be
altered deceptively in quantity, quality, relevance, and/or
manner (see McCornack, 1992) to achieve respondents’
goals? Genuine rational decision making is choosing the op-
tion among viable alternatives that optimizes goal
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costs/beneﬁts of the different choices are known and are
properlyevaluated, for instance, byusing the expectedvalue
formula presented below (Stanovich, 2010). ADCAT postu-
lates that the choice of whether and how to be deceptive is
made quasi-rationally if respondents have sufﬁcient time,
are clear-headed, etc. Quasi-rational decision making is
making a choice among the options considered that,
although not optimally, is perceived by respondents to best
attain goals after they carefully evaluate utilities and likeli-
hoods of salient pros and cons of choice options. Among the
reasons quasi-rational decisions do not optimize goal
attainment, estimates of outcome utilities and their proba-
bilities can be inaccurate. For instance, the affective impact
of future events is often overestimated (Wilson & Gilbert,
2013), and their probabilities can be over or under-
estimated based on the ease with which relevant examples
are brought to mind (availability heuristic, Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982).
Recall that emotional inputs affect decisions (Dawes,
2001; Stanovich, 2010), triggered partly by the social
context and the truth if accessible. For example, “detection
apprehension” over getting caught weighs against dishon-
esty, whereas “duping delight” in anticipation of lying suc-
cessfully encourages it (Ekman & Frank, 1993). ToM
inferences are also crucial in this decision making. Re-
spondents may infer targets’ likely cognitive, affective, or
behavioral responses to learning the truth and predict other
consequences of honesty, anticipate targets’ responses if the
information sought is manipulated deceptively in a partic-
ularwayor two, and perhaps the likely fallout if deception is
detected. In short, ToM [E] and other central executive
functions (Debey, Verschuere, & Crombez, 2012; Visu-Petra,
Miclea, Bus, & Visu-Petra, 2014; Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-
Petra, 2012) allow respondents to infer then combine the
costs and beneﬁts and their likelihoods of sharing fully and
accurately the information that targets seek, which can be
compared with the same of one or more deceptions.
The expected value of a decision or a bet, EV, is calculated
by
P
pivi, where pi is the probability of a particular outcome,
multiplied by vi, the gain or loss of that outcome expressed in
termsofmoneyor subjectiveutility. Summing theseproducts
yields the payoff in the long run for a decision. The option
with the highest EV from respondents’ perspectives maxi-
mizes utility and quasi-rationally should be chosen
(Stanovich, 2010). ADCAT assumes that the default for most
respondents is honesty, deceiving as little as needed to ach-
ieve their goals (Levine, Kim, & Hamel, 2010). The theory
postulates in high-stakes truth solicitations that with sufﬁ-
cient time, etc. respondents ﬁrst intuitively evaluate the
EV(truth telling) as if the formula above were used, that is,
assess the overall cost/beneﬁt of fully and accurately sharing
with targets the information they seek. The more negative it
is the more likely that one or more deception options will be
considered and their EV intuitively computed as if the for-
mulawere used, guided bywhat hasworked in respondents’
pasts or with acquaintances in similar situations (McCornack
et al., in press). ADCAT posits that three germane cognitive
factors will generally be active in WM: respondents’ goal(s),
the social context (e.g., ToM inferences ofwhat targets know),
and the truth if accessible. As sources of spreading activationand inhibition, they will impact the deceptions considered.
For instance, the truth andsocial context canactivate relevant
life memories or schemata as potential bases of the “Target’s
View”. {g} The central executive will inhibit any of the small
pool of deceptions that are irreconcilably inconsistent with
respondents’ goals or with what targets’ may know. Esti-
mating subjective utilities (personal gain/loss) and likeli-
hoods of events occurs intuitively based on preferences,
experience, etc. (Ekman & Frank, 1993; Sip, Roepstorff,
McGregor, & Frith, 2008) and again can be inaccurate
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982; Wilson & Gilbert, 2013).
To illustrate quasi-rational decision making, suppose a
study is conducted testing this account with actual lying. An
11 point Likert scale is used to assess the subjective utility of
possible outcomes (5 ¼ extremely undesirable to re-
spondents, 0 ¼ neutral, 5 ¼ extremely desirable). Consider
the example of a spouse who is deciding whether to admit
to a recent inﬁdelity he had with a friend of his wife in
anticipation of being confronted by her on his whereabouts
on the night of the inﬁdelity. [We concede that wives also
cheat on spouses but randomly selected a particular gender,
male, for the cheater for ease of writing.] A one-time event
he regrets, his goal is to stay happily married. In evaluating
the truth option, he intuitively estimates about a 90% chance
of divorce if he discloses his tryst. On the other hand, even if
the marriage survives, trust and intimacy will be gone.
EVðtruth tellingÞ ¼ :90ð5 : divorceÞ þ :1ð1
: together without intimacyÞ ¼ 4:6
Because of the truth’s negative EV, he ﬁrst considers
understating it by telling his wife he slept with a stranger
he met at a bar while drunk that meant nothing emotion-
ally. He infers that this would lessen slightly the probability
of divorce but still yield an unacceptable EV.
EVðunderstating truthÞ ¼ :70ð5 : divorceÞ þ :3ð1
: together without trustÞ ¼ 3:8
Finally, he infers that, because of how negatively his wife
would likely receive any news of inﬁdelity and the terrible
consequences on their relationship, only a complete fabrica-
tion can achieve his goal. In evaluating this option, he intui-
tively estimates an 80% chance that the tryst and lie will go
undetected in the long run but knows hewill feel guilt at not
confessing, thus a subjective utility rating of 4 rather than 5.
EVðdenial false alibiÞ ¼ :80ð4
: stay married feeling guiltyÞ þ :20ð5
: divorceÞ ¼ 2:2
Because it has the largest EV, the denial and false alibi
are chosen. In support, research shows that respondents
tend to choose deception when it maximizes utility
(Gneezy, 2005; Hurkens & Kartik, 2009; Sip et al., 2008).
However, if no deception option considered produces an EV
greater than that of truth telling, honesty will be selected,
even with a negative EV.
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texts can impose high cognitive loads given the nuance that
must be considered. For instance, they require more ToM
inferences (Apperly et al., 2009) when the target knows the
respondent well. A deception plausible to a stranger can fail
with a close friend (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998).
Second, the EV(truth telling) can be negative not only
whenhonesty is likely to produce unpleasant results, such as
arrest ordivorce, but alsobynot producing sufﬁcient positive
results per respondents’ goals. As an example, when asked
about his job-related experiences, a job candidate decides to
exaggerate them, because he anticipates that the truth will
result in a starting yearly salary below his goal of $150,000.
Third, ADCAT maintains that the level of seriousness of a
truth-soliciting context is not dichotomous: low or high.
Rather, the boundary between the two is fuzzy. The stakes
occur on a continuum from very low to very high. ADCAT
deﬁnes the level of seriousness as hownegative theEV(truth
telling) is for respondents.Recall that IMT2(McCornacketal.,
in press) describes well the impromptu production of
everyday (not so serious, i.e., lowstakes) deceptionofnormal
conversation. We propose that IMT2 applies more when
EV(truth telling) is slightly negative. As EV(truth telling)
becomes moderately or severely negative, ADCAT is more
apropos for understanding the cognition of deception. A
related contrast, IMT2 asserts that deception is often chosen
because it is cognitively easier than truth telling, which is
plausible in normal conversation. ADCAT, however, posits
thatwhen the stakes are higher,minimizing cognitive load is
less important to respondents than attaining their other
goals (e.g., staying out of jail). A ﬁnal contrast, compared to
IMT2, ADCAT is more of a top-down theory of deception by
actively involving the central executive, especially when the
social context is complex, unfamiliar, and deception is un-
rehearsed.When the context is simple, familiar, or deception
is well rehearsed, even serious deception involves more
bottom-up processing.
Fourth, emotions inﬂuence subjective utility ratings of
outcomes, as with the spouse’s rating of 4 for the unde-
tected lie, reﬂecting his self-knowledge that he would
experience guilt. Personality, religion, and other individual
differences affect the utility ratings assigned as well. For
instance, some personalities loathe lying under any cir-
cumstances (Hood, 1982) or know that they are poor liars
(Van Swol, Braun, & Kolb, 2014). ADCAT postulates that
they intuitively assign low subjective utilities (e.g., 1) to
gains from possible deceptions and assign large negative
utility ratings (e.g., 5) to potential losses.
3.4.2. Motivation to lie
If a decision is made to deceive, the level of motivation
for dishonesty, M, is then set intuitively as if this formula
were followed: EV(deception chosen)–EV(truth telling).
Conceptually, this is the gap between the net good expected
from deception and the comparative net bad expected from
honesty. Using the subjective utility rating scale above, M’s
possible range is from a high of 10 (lying-extremely desir-
able, truth telling-extremely undesirable, both with esti-
mated outcome probabilities of 1) to a low of 0 (i.e., each
deception considered with an EV  EV(truth telling)). The
larger M is the more cognitive resources respondents arewilling to assign to preparing Target’s Views, monitoring and
adjusting behavior, etc. (Colwell et al., 2007; Ekman, 1992).
In support, highly motivated liars tend to control their non-
verbal behavior more than liars less motivated or truth
tellers (DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; Porter & ten Brinke,
2010). Even if M is large, if the social context is highly
familiar or simple, a large allocationwill not be required. The
cheating spouse’s decision yields anM of 6.8, which is high.
3.4.3. Choosing honesty or remembering to lie
To illustrate deciding on honesty, suppose that an
innocent male suspect is interrogated by police. Given the
circumstantial evidence incriminating him, he intuitively
estimates about a 75% chance of being believed if he is
completely honest; EV(truth telling) ¼ .75(5: no longer a
suspect) þ .25(1: not believed and still a suspect) ¼ 3.5.
He brieﬂy considers lying to get out from under suspicion
but feels it would eventually be detected:
EV(lie) ¼ 1.00(5: caught lying is like confessing
guilt) ¼ 5. At 8.5, the motivation to lie becomes 0, and
honesty is chosen. Respondents who choose honesty [F]
and need only convey simple factual information can
disclose it [L], experiencing less cognitive load than those
who must construct lies or truths, both of whom will pro-
ceed to the next component, although it is beyond ADCAT’s
scope to explicate how truths are constructed.
Respondents who previously decided to lie about a
particular truth will now remember to deceive as the mem-
ory cue of a truth solicitation arises. If respondents have
mentally linked the decision to likely truth-soliciting con-
texts, it should be quickly activated (see Anderson, 2000). To
illustrate, now that the spouse has decided to convey a false
alibi, he anticipates situationswhenhemaybe confrontedby
his wife, also a central executive function (Gombos, 2006).
3.4.4. Heuristics use when quasi-rational decision making is
impossible
According to dual processing theory, two types of de-
cision making exist: a careful central route such as the
quasi-rational approach just described and a peripheral
route involving shortcuts (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).
Regarding the latter, ADCAT posits that when respondents
are surprised by truth solicitations andmust decide quickly,
in extreme emotional states like high stress, or when
cognitively impaired (e.g., tired, intoxicated), rather than
quasi-rational decision making, heuristics (frugal, quick
rules of thumb applied when information is limited,
Gigerenzer, 2008) become more probable in deciding
whether and how to deceive. As one example, respondents
are likely to use the heuristic of “denying wrongdoing”
when tired (Kouchaki & Smith, 2013; Mead, Baumeister,
Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). Another likely heuristic
is “imitating success” (Boyd & Richerson, 2005): deceiving
because the respondent or another did so successfully in a
similar situation. Another one likely is “satisﬁcing” (Todd &
Miller, 1999): quickly searching alternatives, not for the
best solution, rather for one good-enough per respondents’
goals. Only readily accessible or environmentally salient
positive or negative consequences of truth telling will enter
WM and be compared with those of the most obvious
applicable deception. Reduced capacity, time pressure, etc.
Table 3
Factors affecting the cognitive load of lying and truth telling.
Constraints & other factors adding to the cognitive load of serious deception by componenta
Decision Component
1. Has no decision to lie been made in anticipation of a speciﬁc truth solicitation?
2. Is the decision embedded in a complex (e.g., numerous ToM inferences) and/or unfamiliar social context?
Construction Component
3. Is the Target’s View internally consistent (no conﬂicting details, Ekman & Frank, 1993; Granhag & Hartwig, 2008; Zuckerman
et al., 1981)? Can this consistency be maintained over time?
4. Is the Target’s View externally consistent (congruent with targets’ knowledge, Ekman & Frank, 1993; Zuckerman et al., 1981)?
To be plausible, does the View require taking account of second-order inferences (e.g., The cheating spouse considers what his
wife may tell her friends about his alibi in light of what they are likely to have seen at the time of the inﬁdelity.). Are third-order
inferences required (Apperly et al., 2009)?
5. If the deception is a false narrative, is the underlying Target’s View detailed enough with multimodal information or a realistic timeline
to convince targets (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij & Mann, 2001)?
6. Beyond going undetected, are lies based on the Target’s View likely to achieve respondents’ goals, for instance, enhance the liar’s image
in the target’s eyes or obtain resources?
Action Component
7. Is the respondent highly motivated to lie (Caso, Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005; DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; Vrij & Mann, 2001)?
8. How much monitoring of and control over the self is the respondent exercising to appear sincere or stay in his/her deceptive role
(Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Zuckerman et al., 1981)?
9. How much is the liar monitoring the target’s behavior to see if the lie is convincing (Buller & Burgoon, 1996)?
10. Is the truth deeply entrenched, does truth telling elicit strong emotions, or is truthful responding habitual so that honest responding
proactively interferences with deceptive responding and must be actively suppressed (Banse & Greenwald, 2007; Morgan, SeSage,
& Kosslyn, 2009; Osman et al., 2009; Walczyk et al., 2009)?
11. Is an adequate Target’s View unavailable and/or is delivery of a lie unrehearsed?
12. Is the liar highly anxious (Beilock & Carr, 2005; Eysenck, 1992)?
13. Is the liar having to search LTM to recall the appropriate non-verbal signs of honesty to display?
Factors adding to the cognitive load of truth tellinga
14. Is the truth teller highly anxious about being believed?
15. Is the truth teller highly motivated to be believed (Caso et al., 2005)?
16. Does accessing the truth require fetching episodic or semantic memories that have decayed or not been retrieved recently, or is the
truth unavailable in memory (Altman & Gray, 2002; Walczyk et al., 2005; Wixted, 2004)?
17. Is a deceptive response well rehearsed compared to the corresponding truthful response (Greene et al., 1985; O’Hair et al., 1981)?
18. Does a truthful response require elaboration or qualiﬁcation to be accurately understood by targets? For example, must truth tellers
use their ToM in preparing and sharing truths to make them comprehensible? (Gombos, 2006)? Must the truth be edited to spare the
feelings of someone close (DePaulo, 1992)?
19. Does a truthful response require the generation of a novel opinion, judgment, evaluation, or emotional reaction (DePaulo et al., 2003;
Gombos, 2006)?
20. Does honest communication require conveying complex ideas needing careful translation to be understood by targets?
a These lists are not exhaustive; additional entries and other modiﬁcations are likely based on research.
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utilities and their probabilities below those of quasi-
rationality. To illustrate satisﬁcing, the intoxicated driver,
who believes she is under suspicion for drunk driving,
brieﬂy considers honesty as the ofﬁcer approaches but
quickly infers that only denying having imbibed might
avert arrest. Deception is quickly chosen. In fact, she over-
estimates the chance of being believed in her deception due
to an impaired central executive and is arrested.
EVðtruth tellingÞ ¼ 1:00ð5; fail inevitable field sobriety testÞ
¼ 5
EVðdeny drinkingÞ ¼ :70ð5
: will be believed;no testÞ
 :30ð5; failtestÞ
¼ 2
3.4.5. Summary of core constructs
ToM is needed for inferring targets’ reaction to the truth,
the deceptive information manipulation most likely to
achieve respondents’ goals, and the likely responses in
targets if lies are detected. Items 1 through 2 of Table 3 are
factors adding to the load of this component. It is higher themore complex or unfamiliar the social context is, perhaps
requiring second- or third-order ToM inferences. Cognitive
resources are potentially allocable proportionally to the
level of motivation to lie, M. More complex or unfamiliar
social contexts will draw more on this allocation. Deciding
to lie in advance and anticipating truth-soliciting contexts
lowers intrinsic load at delivering.3.5. Construction component
With the decision to manipulate information in a
particular deceptive way, details of the social context, re-
spondents’ goals, and the truth, if accessible, active in WM,
during this component Target’s Views are elaborated as
needed to go undetected and achieve their other goals.
Whether respondents chose to falsify, equivocate, exag-
gerate, understate, and/or omit inﬂuences the cognitive
load now imposed. For instance, the cheating spouse’s
decision to produce a false alibi will impose a high load
during construction as an extensive quality violation
(McCornack et al., in press), because his wife knows his
habits, preferences, etc. (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). At the
other extreme, constructing a false denial when asked by a
prospective employer and stranger “Have you ever stolen
anything from the work place?” imposes little load as a
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since the respondent infers that the target cannot check the
veracity of the answer.
The social context and the truth provide quickly acces-
sible links to networks of semantic, episodic, and emotional
memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). These pathways are
useful for elaborating Target’s Views, anticipating questions
from targets, and preparing deceptive answers. [G] The
truth or related authentic information of episodic memory
will be preferred and recalled to the episodic buffer as the
basis of a Target’s View, followed by alteration (Leins,
Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Malone, Adams, Anderson, Ansﬁeld,
& DePaulo, 1997; Strömwall & Willén, 2011; Walczyk
et al., 2003), a heuristic that enhances lie plausibility
(DePaulo et al., 2003). The central executive again activates
ToM, enabling inferences of what targets know, suspect,
and will believe based on experience [H] (Talwar et al.,
2007; Wellman et al., 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983).
Target’s Views’ frequently must satisfy restrictions to ach-
ieve goals like items 3 through 6 of Table 3. More are
applicable, each adding intrinsic cognitive load, the more
complex the social context is (DePaulo et al., 2004). When
liars can prepare in advance, Target’s Views will satisfy
more constraints (Vrij et al., 2009;Walczyk et al., 2009) and
the load at delivery attenuates (Greene, O’Hair, Cody, & Yen,
1985; O’Hair, Cody, & McLaughlin, 1981).
3.5.1. Plausibility principle
Although some deceivers are very inventive (Walczyk,
Runco, Tripp, & Smith, 2008), to be plausible, serious lies
are unlikely to be creative. Based on ToM beliefs of what
targets’ ﬁnd believable, in crafting Target’s Views, espe-
cially for false narratives, respondents will intuitively tend
to (a) ﬁrst try to alter the truth or a related episodic
memory of an event personally or vicariously experienced
(Levine et al., 2010;Malone et al., 1997; Strömwall &Willén,
2011; Walczyk et al., 2003) or other personally experienced
sources of vivid, authentic detail (e.g., a scene from a real-
istic movie), a notion consistent with IMT2’s proposition
IM5 (see McCornack et al., in press) by which deception
involving quality violations are built largely on truthful
memories. Recently encoded or activated memories will be
preferred (Leins et al., 2013) due to minimal decay of detail.
If authentic memories are unavailable, perhaps due to
limited relevant life experience, (b) schemata and scripts of
what are typical in a particular social context will serve as
the basis, which are vaguer but conventional (Sporer &
Schwandt, 2007). If they are unavailable, (c) Target’s
Views will be assembled inferentially from assorted infor-
mation activated from LTM and in the environment (Smith,
1998), imposing high cognitive load (Sporer & Schwandt,
2007). This predicted ordering is the plausibility principle.
From (a) to (c), intrinsic cognitive load of construction
generally increases, and lie plausibility generally decreases.
Little research has examined how lies are constructed. A
report by Leins et al. (2013) supports this principle. In two
studies, adults were instructed to lie about a recent life
event and later describe how they did so; 67% of partici-
pants in Study 1 and 86% in Study 2 reported altering a
memory of an actual event, usually recent. The remaining
33% of participants of Study 1 reported “a plausible story”,suggesting that schemata or scripts were used. As the
second choice predicted by the plausibility principle, they
should provide the basis of Target’s Views less often. Also
supportive of the principle, when constructing Target’s
Views, children are likely to altermemories of actual events
(Strömwall, Granhag, & Landstrom, 2007).
Another study by Strömwall and Willén (2011) also
provides support. Investigators asked 35 convicted crimi-
nals to describe strategies they use in deceiving authorities.
Those relevant to information manipulation are recounted
here. Staying close to the truth, because such deceptions
are easiest to remember, was the most common strategy
reported, followed by keeping responses simple, plausible,
and as rich in detail as required. Generally, these strategies
attempt to minimize cognitive load and maximize believ-
ability by using authentic experiences, all consistent with
the plausibility principle. Similar strategies of deceptive
information manipulation have been reported by Colwell,
Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Woods, and Michlik (2006).
3.5.2. Multimodal Target’s Views
In anticipation of high-stakes truth solicitations,
respondent who decide on deception often prepare in
advance (Hines et al., 2010; Strömwall & Willén, 2011).
Recall that respondents typically keep the information
shared simple, lest they contradict themselves or targets’
knowledge with a stray detail (Strömwall & Willén, 2011;
Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 2006). ADCAT holds that,
based on respondents’ experiences with similar truth-
soliciting context and ToM inferences of what targets’ are
likely to ask, Target’s Views will be embellish as needed,
which relies on the central executive. For instance, a View
involving a false narrative may need auditory, visual, or
tactile details of events and a believable timeline (Vrij &
Mann, 2001). Suppose the cheating spouse’s false alibi will
be that he had dinner with his buddies at the time of his
inﬁdelity, salient in memory because it is a typical activity
for him that they will corroborate. Enough detail must be in
the View or readily accessible for him to answer convinc-
ingly his doubtingwife’s potential queries: “Who sat to your
left?” “Howcould dinner take four hours?” (Vrij et al., 2009).
An actual episodic memory of a previous 2 h dining expe-
rience is the basis. Once recalled to the episodic buffer, [H]
this true narrative is expanded to 4 h by inserting plausible
events (e.g., very slow service) and tweaked to satisfy con-
straints of Table 3 (Vrij, Granhag et al., 2010), all guided by
ToM. Second- or third-order inferences may be required to
add sufﬁcient detail to ensure long-term plausibility (see
item 4 of Table 3). If no episodic memory is available, the
central executive can use the “visuo-spatial sketchpad” {b}
to generate a deceptive restaurant account. His restaurant
schema can inform seating arrangements and other spatial
details. His “dining out” script can guide the sequencing of
events, etc. (Alba & Hasher, 1983; Kintsch, 1998; Loftus,
2007; Sporer & Schwandt, 2007). Lie construction imposes
cognitive load (DePaulo et al., 2003; Greene et al., 1985;
Heilveil, 1976; Walczyk et al., 2003, 2005).
3.5.3. Cognitive load and rehearsal
Per the central principle, whenpossible, respondentswill
commit Target’s Views to LTM to lessen the cognitive load of
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impromptu on hearing a question, the question and social
context will activate the View, which may require tweaking
to ﬁt the social context (Vrij, Granhag et al., 2010). Antici-
pating truth solicitations and preparing Target’s Views and
related lies are load reducing acts that lower response times,
inconsistencies, or other signs of load compared to unre-
hearsed lying (DePaulo et al., 2003; Hu, Chen, & Fu, 2012;
Van Bockstaele et al., 2012; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, &
Otgaar, 2011; Vrij et al., 2009). Extended rehearsal can
lower load below that of truth telling (Dike, Baranoski, &
Grifﬁth, 2005; Greene et al., 1985; O’Hair et al., 1981).
Slight rehearsal may impose loads a bit higher (Walczyk
et al., 2009). Remembering to lie and recalling a new one
can bemore effortful than typically automatic truth retrieval
(Glenberg et al., 1998; Pirolli & Anderson, 1985).
3.5.4. Summary of the core constructs
ToM inferences ensure that Target’s Views are plausible
and achieve respondents’ goals. Per the central principle,
when possible, respondents will prepare Target’s Views
and practice lying based on them to reduce intrinsic load at
delivery (Colwell et al., 2007; Ekman, 1992; Hines et al.,
2010; Strömwall & Willén, 2011) and will intuitively
follow the plausibility principle when constructing Target’s
Views to minimize load and maximize believability at
delivery.
3.6. Action component
Now respondents deliver lies to targets. [I] Recall that a
truth has been solicited and is now active in WM, if avail-
able, (see Activation Component) or newly encoded. When
the stakes are high, both liars and truth tellers generally
attempt to appear sincere and relaxed, but liars take their
credibility less for granted and may need to hide signs of
guilt or shame (Ekman, 2001; Ekman & Frank, 1993; Vrij,
Granhag et al., 2010) whereas truth tellers are more likely
to believe their honesty will show through (Hartwig &
Granhag, 2007; Masip & Herrero, 2013). Respondents’
ToM beliefs are often mistaken about truth tellers’ actual
behavior, including that they are always relaxed and never
convey narratives with imperfections like forgotten details
(DePaulo et al., 2003). As a result, particularly in serious
situations, liars can be betrayed by toomuch self-regulation
(Butterworth, 1978; DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989). If a deci-
sion to lie about a particular truth was made, an adequate
Target’s View is prepared, and lies based on it are well
rehearsed, [J] the cognitive load of delivery will be low
(Greene et al., 1985). As these are absent, load will increase
andmanifest during delivery. The heaviest load is predicted
when a truth solicitation embedded in an unfamiliar,
complex social context surprises respondents who choose
to deceive by constructing a false narrative (Walczyk et al.,
2005). Items 7 through 13 of Table 3 are factors that add to
the intrinsic or extraneous load of delivering lies. Generally,
more apply the higher the stakes, the more complex or
unfamiliar the social context, and the more unrehearsed
the deception (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo &
Kirkendol, 1989; O’Sullivan, Frank, & Hurley, 2009).
Although Table 3 acknowledges the load-inducing natureof non-verbal aspects of deception, recall that ADCAT is
focused on cognitive aspects, particularly information
manipulation.
3.6.1. Proactive interference of honest responding with lying
Because truth telling is normative (Greene & Paxton,
2009; Levine et al., 2010; Saxe, 1991), it can cause a
Stroop-like interference with the often incompatible
response of lying (Mohamed et al., 2006; Osman, Channon,
& Fitzpatrick, 2009; Pennebaker & Chew, 1985). ADCAT
posits that with the decision to deceive in a particular way
active inWM, the central executive suppresses the accurate
sharing of speciﬁc information, [K] often involving active
inhibitory centers in the frontal lobe (Johnson et al., 2004;
Kozel, Padgett, & George, 2004; Mohamed et al., 2006). The
intrinsic load of inhibiting truthful responding depends on
how elaborate truth-related memories are and how
habitual honest responding is (Van Bockstaele et al., 2012;
Verschuere et al., 2011). For instance, if a truth was recently
encoded or is unavailable in memory, it will cause minimal
interferencewith lying. Deception involving well rehearsed
truths, such as respondents’ ﬁrst names or deeply held
beliefs, will entail more proactive interference (Banse &
Greenwald, 2007; DePaulo, 1992). In support, using
answer response time as the cue, Walczyk et al. (2009)
found better discrimination between college students
who lied or told the truth about their living arrangements
or academic majors than doing so about what they did on
Saturday night or their job histories. The ﬁrst two foci, well
rehearsed by daily living, resulted in prompt answers in
truth tellers and proactive interference in liars.
3.6.2. Lowering load, enhancing lie generation, and speech
production
High motivation to lie can heighten “detection appre-
hension” (Ekman & Frank, 1993). Per the central principle,
when respondents must deliver lies under high intrinsic
cognitive load (e.g., convey an unrehearsed false narrative),
they will act to reduce extraneous load. Table 4 lists be-
haviors hypothesized to lower it by attenuating anxiety as
well as environmental or bodily distraction so that liars can
allocate maximum cognitive resources to lying. For
example, breaking eye contact reduces load by lowering
anxiety (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & Fisher, 2010; Walczyk, Grifﬁth,
Yates, Visconte, & Simoneaux, 2013). Averting eyes away
from people or other visual distraction can help liars focus
on memory retrieval, infer targets’ mental states, and do
other internal processing needed for lie construction
(Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps, 2005; Doherty-Sneddon,
Burce, Bonner, Longbotham, & Doyle, 2002; Glenberg
et al., 1998; Rayner, 1998; Walczyk et al., 2012). Whereas
long response times and dilated pupils are direct indices of
cognitive load (Anderson, 2000; Heilveil, 1976; Rayner,
1998), averting gaze and reducing eye movement are
postulated to be indirect signs, reﬂecting liars’ attempts to
reduce load. Table 4 also presents actions of unrehearsed
liars that can facilitate lie construction during delivery,
including stalling for time for lie construction.
As does IMT2 (McCornack et al., in press), ADCAT postu-
lates that the same speech production modules underlie
truthful and deceptive discourse.Moreover, analogous to the
Table 5
Major hypotheses of ADCAT by component.
Activation Component
1. The truth (accurate information sought by the target), if
available, will generally be automatically activated from
LTM or be encoded directly from the environment in
response to a truth solicitation.
2. Cognitive load will be imposed on respondents as
predicted by Fig. 1. For instance, those who intend to be
honest at the outset, from whom simple factual truths are
solicited, will have the lowest cognitive loads of all respondents,
because only the Activation Component is involved. [C]
Decision Component
3. The probability of deception will increase as EV(truth
telling) becomes more negative.
4. Liars’ effort and persistence at deception will be positively
correlated with their motivation to lie, M, as given by
EV(deception chosen)–EV(truth telling). Speciﬁcally, higher
M values will be associated with a greater willingness to allocate
cognitive resources to construct a Target’s View, to
generate ToM inferences, etc.
Construction Component
5. When confronted with truth-soliciting contexts varying
in familiarity, liars will construct Target’s Views
according to the plausibility principle, generally minimizing
intrinsic cognitive load and maximizing believability,
consistent with the central principle.
6. When delivering novel fabrications, unrehearsed liars will
tend to scan their environments and explicitly search LTM
more than rehearsed liars or truth tellers when they have
neither relevant episodic memories nor relevant schemata
readily accessible in memory for generating Target’s Views.
Action Component
7. Lying will impose more cognitive load than truth telling to
the extent that items 1 though 13 of Table 3 apply during
the Action Component. More will apply the more complex,
unfamiliar, or serious the truth-soliciting context is or the less
rehearsed deceptive responding is. On the other hand, well
rehearsed liars or those in highly familiar social contexts,
for instance, are unlikely to need to monitor their own
behavior (#8), that of the targets (#9), or unlikely to be
anxious (#12). Well prepared and rehearsed liars will
experience minimal cognitive load from items 1 through 6.
8. Slightly rehearsed lying will entail more cognitive load than truth
telling, whereas well rehearsed lying will entail less cognitive
load than truth telling.
9. Entrenched truths (e.g., those central to respondents’ lives,
deeply held beliefs) will cause more proactive interference
with lying, that must be inhibited, than will peripheral or
recently encoded truths.
10. During delivery, unrehearsed liars will exhibit higher rates
of the load-reducing behaviors of Table 4 than rehearsed liars
and truth tellers who are relating corresponding truths.
Table 4
Cognitive load-reducing and deception-generating behaviors of the action
component.
Behavior Beneﬁt for liar
Extraneous load reductiona
1. Close eyes Minimize environmental
distraction, anxiety, guilt, etc.
(Doherty-Sneddon & Phelps,
2005; Doherty-Sneddon et al.,
2002; Glenberg et al., 1998)
2. Avert gaze away from,
focus on a neutral stimulus
Minimize distraction, anxiety,
guilt, etc. (Doherty-Sneddon &
Phelps, 2005; Doherty-Sneddon
et al., 2002; Glenberg et al., 1998;
Vrij, Mann et al., 2010; Walczyk,
Grifﬁth et al., 2013)
3. Reduce eye movements Minimize environmental
distraction (Walczyk et al., 2012)
4. Reduce body movements Minimize intrapersonal
distraction, lower anxiety
5. Engage in relaxation Reduce extraneous load by
lowering anxiety
Enhance deception constructiona
6. “Time-buying” strategies
(e.g., asking that a question
be repeated, long pause
before or while answering
or within narratives
Increase the time for lie
construction or lie recall (DePaulo
et al., 2003; Walczyk et al., 2003).
7. Increase eye movements/scan Seek environmental hints for lie
construction
a These lists too are not exhaustive andwill likely expandwith research.
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duction (Herrmann, 1983), a Target’s View consists of one or
more of the following representations of information:
propositions, schemata, visual/auditory images, episodic
memories, a timeline of events, etc. A View can guide the
speech production module [J] and be conveyed equivalently
with different verbal productions (see Dell, Chang, & Grifﬁn,
1999).
3.6.3. Summary of core constructs
ToM beliefs guide delivery based on what respondents
think targets ﬁnd sincere. The targets’ behavior and that of
the self may bemonitored to infer whether lies are believed.
If no Target’s Views or lies were prepared, deceptions will be
constructed impromptu, often at high cognitive load.
Cognitive resources may be needed by the central executive
to overcome the proactive interference of truth telling,
especially when truths are entrenched or responding hon-
estly is habitual. Unrehearsed liars will tend to use the be-
haviors of Table 4 to reduce extraneous load and will follow
the plausibility principle in constructing deception. If
adequate Target’s Views have been prepared, they will be
navigated [J] in response to speciﬁc questions or other truth
solicitations. If Views satisfy items 3 through 6 of Table 3 in
advance, lying should impose minimal intrinsic load at de-
livery so that respondents can appear relaxed.
3.7. Major hypotheses of ADCAT
Based on the preceding, major hypotheses of the theory
are shown in Table 5. They summarize ADCAT and can open
up new lines of research. Some are also predictions of the
other cognitive perspectives we reviewed, such as theactivation of the truth (#1) and proactive interference of
truthful responding with deception (#9). Those pertaining
to the decision to deceive (#3), the motivation to deceive
(#4), the plausibility principle (#5), facilitating lie con-
struction (#6), and themanagement of cognitive load (#10)
are new. The most important contribution here is their
integration within a single theoretical framework.
4. Cognitive load of dishonesty versus honesty:
implications for lie detection
As with most truth telling, most everyday deception
makes minimal demands on cognitive resources (DePaulo
& Kashy, 1998; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, &
Epstein, 1996). DePaulo et al. (2003), Vrij, Granhag et al.
J.J. Walczyk et al. / New Ideas in Psychology 34 (2014) 22–36 33(2010), and Zuckerman et al. (1981), among others, identify
reasons why lying, especially involving high stakes, can
impose greater cognitive load than truth telling, many
appearing in Table 3. On the other hand, items 14 through
20 are occasions when truth telling can impose greater
load, many noted by McCornack et al. (in press).
The ADCM (Walczyk et al., 2003) assumed that lies are
constructed and truths are retrieved. ADCAT notes that
rehearsed deception entails retrieved lies, and truths
sometimes are constructed (DePaulo, 1992; DePaulo et al.,
2003; Gombos, 2006; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007).
The theory advances understanding of when lying is more
cognitively demanding than truth telling, vice versa, and
informs when indices of cognitive load signal deception.
Fig. 1 is helpful in comparing cognitive loads. Based on it
and Table 3, some generalizations are warranted regarding
the load of cognitive aspects (e.g., information manipula-
tion) of deception versus truth telling. Whichever requires
a more complex response (e.g., constructed, edited, not
simply recalled), honesty or dishonesty, will impose
greater cognitive load (McCornack, 1997; McCornack et al.,
in press). Whichever requires a more spontaneous (unre-
hearsed) or novel responsewill as well. Whichever requires
more explicit memory searching, either to retrieve a truth
or to ﬁnd information useful for lie construction, will entail
more load. Of course, complex and spontaneous respond-
ing can co-occur with explicit memory searching as when
respondents answer unrehearsed and honestly the ques-
tion “What was your favorite childhood vacation?”
New cognitive load-inducing methods of lie detection
have recently been proposed. For instance, Vrij et al. (2008)
suggested that extraneous load could be selectively
increased on deceptive respondents by adding a concurrent
task during interrogation (see {k} of Table 1) that might
interfere with lying more than truth telling and amplify
cues to deception. Vrij, Granhag et al. (2010) reviewed other
such proposals for inducing load on liars, including having
respondents recall events in reverse chronological order or
answer unanticipated questions. Although innovative,
these techniques generally are neither based on a theory of
deception nor have their proposers typically adequately
considered the load-reducing countermeasure of rehearsal
(Walczyk, Grifﬁth et al., 2013; Walczyk, Igou et al., 2013).
Recall that a major criticism of the CQT of the polygraph is
that it is not based on a valid theory of deception. It is
important not to repeat this mistake with these promising
new approaches (Walczyk, Grifﬁth et al., 2013; Walczyk,
Igou et al., 2013).
ADCAT can help reﬁne and expand cognitive load-
inducing techniques by illuminating underlying cognitive
processes. Recall, for instance, that the theory incorporates
rehearsal, likely in high-stakes situations (Colwell et al.,
2007; Ekman, 1992; Hines et al., 2010; Strömwall &
Willén, 2011). Research testing and expanding ADCAT
may reveal under what circumstances lying imposes
greater load than truth telling and when the results of
studies generalize to the ﬁeld (National Research Council,
2003). As another example, per the plausibility principle,
liars ﬁrst try to use the truth or recent memories of life
events to construct Target’s Views, which minimizes
cognitive differences between liars and truth tellers, anotion consistent with the Reality Monitoring (Masip,
Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004) and
Criteria-based Content Analysis (Vrij, 2005) approaches to
lie detection. If accurate, then those developing cognitive
load-inducing approaches should note that load differences
between liars and truth tellers may not be as large as pre-
viously hypothesized (Buller & Burgoon, 1996; Zuckerman
et al., 1981). One ﬁnal example, ADCAT’s emphasis on
ToM suggests that in truth tellers’ narratives, ﬁrst- or
second-order inferences of the mental states of others are
made naturally. Asking surprise questions requiring such
inferences (e.g., the wife asking her cheating spouse “What
was Andy thinking about during dinner?”) should induce
high cognitive load in liars, which may amplify cues to
deception.
5. Research opportunities
The hypotheses of Table 5 provide a few new avenues
for research. Additional ones are now considered. Five of
the six cognitive perspectives on deception we reviewed
(all but the ADCM) are largely silent on the decisionmaking
process of whether to deceive. According to ADCAT, this
component is crucial to serious lying in determining the
type of deceptive informationmanipulation and the level of
motivation. The theory posits a mathematical account by
adapting a formula from the decision making literature to
capture how respondents intuitively combine estimates of
outcome likelihoods and subjective utilities as well as a
related formula for the motivation to lie. The expected
value approach is a parsimonious, testable way of under-
standing how respondents may integrate the pros and cons
of truth telling then compare them with those of feasible
deceptions to arrive at quasi-rational decisions. Related
questions present themselves. How much time pressure or
cognitive impairmentmust occur before heuristics are used
in lieu of quasi-rationality? When pressed for time or
impaired, do respondents use the “satisﬁcing” or “imitate
success” heuristics? Which others may be used?
What are ADCAT’s implications for understanding
developmental improvement in deception? The expanded
roles of the central executive and ToM to all four compo-
nents are relevant (Gombos, 2006; Wellman et al., 2001).
Cognitive developmental psychologists will ﬁnd Fig. 1
useful for generating research questions and hypotheses.
With age, do children’s decisions to lie becomemore quasi-
rational by maximizing EV? Few studies have examined
how children construct lies (e.g., Strömwall et al., 2007). Do
they do so in greater approximation to the plausibility
principle with age, that is, come to adopt the ToM belief
that lies based on actual experiences are most likely to
succeed?
6. Limitations and conclusion
Some limitations of the theory are noteworthy. First, the
examples of serious deception we emphasized concerned
manipulating episodic memories. Other kinds must be
considered with reﬁnement like the telling of high-stakes
lies for personal gain when no truths are solicited. For
instance, a conman approaches an elderly couple, pitching
J.J. Walczyk et al. / New Ideas in Psychology 34 (2014) 22–3634an investment opportunity to double their money within
ﬁve years. Second, although ADCAT is based on established
constructs, elements of the theory have yet to be thor-
oughly tested (e.g., hypotheses 3–5 of Table 5). Third, for
furthering understanding of serious lies, reﬁnement of
ADCAT’s four components will be necessary based on
research. Finally, non-verbal aspects (i.e., impression
management, Hartwig et al., 2010) are important and will
have to be incorporated as ADCAT is expanded.
As captured in Fig. 1, ADCAT details the social cognition
of high-stakes deception, much of which occurs in parallel,
intuitively, and seamlessly when the social context is sim-
ple, familiar, or deception is well rehearsed. As these are
absent, serious deception involves more executive (top-
down) processes. The theory also underscores the perva-
sive roles played by ToM and cognitive resources in all four
components. It can help researchers understand and inte-
grate theoretically major aspects of the cognition of high-
stakes deception, open up new areas of research, and
advance cognitive load-inducing lie detection.
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